Theme #3 Criminal Interference

Introducing the themed issue Criminal interference

Alex Straathof and Rita van Dijk, October 2026

We need a new strategy against criminal interference

The current approach to criminal interference is costing more and more money, while organised crime is gaining influence rather than losing it. That is the conclusion of the authoritative Dutch Threat Assessment on Undermining (Dreigingsbeeld Ondermijning Nederland, 2026). Media commentators say the Netherlands is beginning to show traits of a ‘narco-state’. It is time to change strategy.

The current approach focuses heavily on detecting and prosecuting criminals, erecting barriers, and disrupting criminal networks and money flows. That remains necessary. But once criminals manage to gain access to legitimate organisations and build up influence there, repression alone is not enough.

The core of the renewed strategy is to start with businesses and public organisations that are vulnerable to criminal interference. That is where criminal organisations find their way in and where the contamination begins. This means developing response capacity so that criminals are kept out. Response capacity is also needed once criminal influence has taken root inside an organisation. By starting with organisations, we can intervene earlier and more deeply than is currently the case.

Contamination

A marina manager who, for a fee, turns a blind eye to unknown vessels mooring at night. A pupil who is persistently absent from school, not because of illness or because he has to help out at home as a young carer, but because he has been recruited to transport drugs, money or weapons. An intern in a municipality’s finance department who changes the bank account number on payment reminders. A football club whose sponsorship money, on closer inspection, flows through a murky network. These are examples from everyday practice, and they show that criminal interference can affect any organisation: a business, a school, a government body, a sports club.

This special issue is about that phenomenon: criminal interference. And about what essentially happens when criminals penetrate your organisation. Criminal interference is not only a security or integrity issue, but also a cultural issue that demands the attention of leadership.

When criminals work with employees or gain influence within an organisation, more changes than just a process or a system. Norms, loyalties and ways of interacting shift with it. Employees are no longer focused solely on the organisation’s goals but, directly or indirectly, also serve the interests of criminal networks. In this way, features of criminal cultures creep in: silence, looking the other way, self-enrichment, contempt for laws and regulations, intimidation, fear, extortion and (threats of) violence. What begins as the influencing of one individual can grow into a collective dynamic in which deviant behaviour within an organisation starts to seem normal.

Surprisingly, organisational culture is often overlooked in the approach to criminal interference. Organisations invest mainly in barriers: screening, supervision, cameras, and employment-law and criminal-law interventions. Useful, but one-sided, because without attention to organisational culture, important signals and opportunities for management to intervene remain out of sight.

A cultural lens shows that some organisations are more vulnerable than others. Closed cultures, strong internal loyalties, cultures of silence and the covering-up of problems enlarge the breeding ground for criminal interference. Openness, approachability, social connectedness and transparency, on the other hand, offer protection. Anyone who wants to understand and combat criminal interference must therefore look at the culture of organisations and deploy interventions that reshape that culture and make it more resilient. In this special issue we explore targeted culture interventions, as a complement to what businesses, associations, public institutions, the police, the Public Prosecution Service, municipalities and their partnerships are already doing.

That brings us to a word that is deliberately absent from the previous paragraphs: ondermijning, or “undermining”. It is the common term for the phenomenon described, but its meaning is more diffuse than it first appears. The concept comes from historical warfare: enemies dug tunnels beneath fortified towns to make the walls collapse, after which the troops could pour in. The word therefore mainly denotes destructive danger from outside. But a business is not a fortress, and destroying a business is not the aim. Getting in is rarely the problem, and it happens easily. What the danger really consists of is what arises after entry: a parasitic blending of underworld and upperworld, of criminal and legal interests, networks and practices. That is why “interference” is a better word than “undermining”. Using that term raises an important question: how far has that interference advanced in our society and our organisations, and what priority does tackling it deserve?

A route through the special issue

Criminal interference cannot be captured in a single definition, a single sector or a single approach. In this special issue we look at the phenomenon from different perspectives. We begin with the nature and scale of the problem, move on to a number of concrete examples from practice where criminal interference becomes visible, and close with the question of what organisations can do about it.

The phenomenon in focus

What do we mean by criminal interference, and how big is the problem? In The long arm of criminal interference, we outline the scale and impact of criminal interference in the Netherlands. This makes the case for a new strategy in which organisations themselves are clearly in the driving seat. The article The impact of criminal interference on organisational culture then zooms in on what can happen inside organisations. It shows how a gradual blending can arise, and how an organisation can come to display more and more features of a criminal organisation. If you want to know more about the signs of criminal interference, listen to the podcast in which Alex Straathof is interviewed on the subject.

Criminal interference in practice

Next, we shift our focus to concrete situations and sectors. In an article on the ornamental horticulture sector, we show how criminal interference takes shape within this specific industry. We also look at the role of young people. ‘Just a quick job’: young people drawn into crime describes how young people can become involved in crime step by step.

Schools are an important place to pick up on signals. In Teachers: We see young people slipping into crime two teachers describe what they encounter in and around the school walls and what role schools can play in recognising young people at risk of sliding into crime. We also speak with researcher Sven Janssen, project leader of a sector study on crime within small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In Criminals at the gate: how can businesses become resilient?, he addresses how entrepreneurs can strengthen their resilience.

From insight to approach

The final part of the special issue is devoted to interventions. What can organisations do when criminal interference presents itself, and which approach suits the different stages through which this process can develop?

In the article Guardian Scripting: how entrepreneurs can gain control over criminal interference, we explore a method that helps to systematically investigate where regular business processes intersect with criminal processes. In an interview, researcher Jimmy Maan explains how this method works and how organisations can use it to strengthen their resilience against criminal interference.

We close with the long read Cultural interventions against criminal interference, which examines in depth what entrepreneurs can do about criminal interference. We show which interventions may be needed at different stages of interference.

In this way, the special issue moves from understanding and recognising to taking action: from the nature and scale of criminal interference, via concrete situations in practice, to ways in which organisations can defend themselves against it.

Several reviewers contributed to this special issue. We thank Edo Smid (lawyer in Amsterdam), David Polinder (Managing Director of ViaFormance) and Erik Essen (organisational adviser, Municipality of Haarlemmermeer). We would also like to mention Rens Machielse, who composed the music specially for the podcast.

We hope this publication inspires you and gives you food for thought. Do you have ideas, experiences or comments after reading? We would love to hear from you. You can reach us at info@platformcultuurverandering.nl.