Theme #3 Criminal interference

The impact of criminal interference on organisational culture

Alex Straathof, October 2026

Many entrepreneurs think of criminal interference primarily in terms of fraud, reputational damage and financial loss. But criminal interference often affects something more fundamental: the culture of the organisation. Anyone who fails to understand how criminal networks operate risks overlooking important warning signs.

What makes a criminal organisation different?

A criminal organisation is like a parasite. It cannot exist independently and always needs other organisations in order to survive. In effect, criminal organisations borrow parts of the business processes of legitimate organisations. They do not have their own transport department, for example, so they exploit the transport functions of companies that own lorries. They also use the bank accounts of young people (so-called ‘money mules’) to carry out transactions while keeping themselves out of sight. Criminal benefactors may support sports clubs facing financial difficulties, thereby creating opportunities to launder money. Or they may give substantial tips to pub landlords so that criminal networks can use a function room at the back of the pub to meet and discuss their affairs.

Criminal enterprises differ significantly from legitimate businesses. They generally have no formal structure, no transparent accounts and no control mechanisms such as accountants’ checks or audits. They often operate as informal networks in which personal relationships matter more than positions or organisational charts.

Because these networks must constantly take police investigations and criminal prosecution into account, they operate in an environment that they themselves perceive as hostile. This affects their organisational culture.

Trust plays a central role. Not the trust that develops through professional cooperation, but trust based on loyalty. Criminal organisations therefore often consist of family networks, childhood friendships or people who share a common background. Precisely because the risks are so high, key positions are often given to people who have known one another for many years.

Another characteristic is that conflicts are not resolved through the normal legal system. Someone who breaks an agreement, passes information to the police or becomes involved in a failed drug deal cannot simply go to court. Instead, conflicts are settled through displays of power, intimidation or violence.

Secrecy and concealment are also essential. Agreements are recorded as little as possible, responsibilities are obscured and activities are deliberately kept out of sight. The aim is always the same: to prevent illegal activities from being traced back to those responsible, and particularly to those giving the orders.

How organisational culture develops

No organisational culture stands still. Companies constantly adapt to changing circumstances. In doing so, new ideas, habits, norms and ways of working emerge.

Culture essentially develops in two ways. Sometimes an organisation develops new solutions to problems it encounters, together with the beliefs and norms associated with those solutions. For example, suppose a restaurant discovers that a ‘money-maker dish’ has suddenly become less popular with customers. What solution will the chef and the team come up with to compensate for the loss of revenue? Organisations also regularly adopt practices from outside. The rapid uptake of artificial intelligence by translation agencies, IT companies and law firms is an example. It offers a way of reducing staff costs and remaining competitive.

Criminal interference, however, leads to a particular form of adopting solutions from outside. It does not simply introduce new ways of working into a legitimate organisation; it can also bring in ways of thinking, norms and patterns of behaviour associated with a criminal environment.

Criminal interference causes the actual power relationships within the organisation to shift

Because illegal activities have to remain hidden, a culture of silence often develops. Employees sense that certain subjects are no longer open for discussion. In some cases, this develops into a culture of fear in which intimidation or threats play a role.

Secrecy between colleagues also leads to distrust. People no longer know whom they can trust or what interests are at play. Cooperation deteriorates as a result, mistakes are reported less readily and the performance of the affected company comes under pressure.

At the same time, some employees benefit from the new situation. They receive privileges, enrich themselves or misuse company resources. As a result, the actual power relationships within the organisation shift.

Statistics from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) provide an indication of management involvement. In 2022, 12,435 business establishments had an owner or director who had been convicted of a drug offence during the preceding ten years. This represented 0.7% of all business establishments in the Netherlands.

Managers play an important role as gatekeepers. Criminals are often not so much interested in taking over an entire company as in gaining influence over what an organisation owns or can arrange: information, systems, premises, licences, transport, customers, procurement processes, financial services or contacts.

Managers also set an example, encouraging employees to follow their behaviour. Their actions help determine what is and is not considered acceptable. This includes knowingly or unknowingly facilitating criminal influence by:

  • appointing someone with criminal connections to a vulnerable position;
  • applying inadequate screening procedures;
  • granting overly broad access rights;
  • allowing exceptions to procedures;
  • bringing in suppliers or customers with links to the criminal milieu;
  • making confidential information too widely available;
  • deliberately or inadvertently bypassing controls.

Similar decisions by managers can lead employees to start regarding criminal influence within their organisation as acceptable.

When the culture shifts

The longer criminal interference continues, the more the organisation changes from within. Some employees leave because they can no longer identify with the new way of working. Others adapt. New or existing informal leaders gain more influence than formal management. Employees begin to avoid risks, take sick leave more often or deliberately distance themselves from sensitive subjects.

Over time, a dangerous process takes hold: normalisation. Behaviour that was previously regarded as strange or undesirable gradually comes to be seen as normal. People develop justifications for why the situation is not really so bad or may even be necessary.

At that point, it is not only employees’ behaviour that changes; the way people think changes too. They begin to see their organisation differently. The collective mindset shifts. And relationships between people change. What started as an incident or a form of interference develops into a structural change in organisational culture.

Consider an installation company in which every employee has access to a company van. When working on longer-term projects, one of the electricians takes the van home because he has to return to the same address the following day. But suppose that employee starts using the company’s materials and tools to do work on the side in a friend’s drugs laboratory in the evenings. Over time, this can affect the company’s culture.

A colleague sees the van parked at a strange address and asks a few questions the next day, only to receive a defensive and irritable response. This is unusual given the normally relaxed and friendly relationships between colleagues. Six months later, the electrician books an expensive family holiday and his colleagues start talking about him. They look for explanations for his behaviour because he does not provide any himself. He remains silent. Resentment develops and colleagues begin to avoid him. Working with him becomes difficult.

And if another colleague, a plumber, starts working for the same drugs laboratory, the situation develops further. A subculture begins to emerge, creating a problem within the installation company.

The slippery slope of criminal interference

The precise way in which such a shift occurs becomes clearer when the process is considered in stages. In most cases, it develops gradually. What begins as an apparently harmless departure from the rules can grow into a situation in which a company becomes dependent on criminal activities or even becomes part of a criminal network.

The degree of criminal interference can be viewed as a slippery slope with four stages: Entry, Intrusion, Entrenchment and Corrupting the organisation as a whole. From the stage Intrusion onwards, the culture of the affected organisation begins to be undermined. In the final article in this themed edition, we take a closer look at what happens during these different stages and what can be done about it.

It is precisely the gradual nature of criminal interference that makes it dangerous and allows normalisation to take hold

Why the process often goes unnoticed for a long time

It is precisely the gradual nature of criminal interference that makes it dangerous. Each successive step is limited in scope and can often be justified. An exception to a procedure, a customer receiving special treatment or a payment being processed slightly differently may seem harmless in isolation.

The problem arises when such exceptions accumulate. At that point, it is not only the rules that shift, but also the norms. Behaviour that was previously unacceptable becomes taken for granted. The organisation becomes accustomed to the new reality.

This is why attention must be paid not only to suspicious transactions, but also to changes in behaviour, cooperation and decision-making. Criminal interference is therefore not merely a financial or legal problem; it is above all a matter of organisational culture.

Five signs of criminal interference

Criminal interference often leaves recognisable traces for those who know what to look for. Management needs to develop an awareness of these signs. Behaviours and ways of thinking that are normal within a criminal organisation can become visible in the culture of a legitimate organisation exposed to criminal influence. Each of the following five signs is illustrated with two or three examples.

1. Using illicit money as a solution

  • Noticeable spending patterns emerge among employees who have debts, such as nights out, expensive holidays or new cars.
  • Because the labour market is tight, management attracts new employees with a signing bonus funded with illicit money.

2. Indifference to the consequences for victims

  • Negative consequences for customers, suppliers, competitors or society are not prioritised and are played down. During house construction, for example, employees choose the easiest way to carry out their work, damaging work previously done by others. This can lead to defects beneath the ground or behind walls that residents only discover later.
  • Financial gain takes precedence over social responsibility, for example by charging customers with limited knowledge of the market excessively high prices. This attitude among management can be copied by employees in all sorts of ways, such as stealing from the employer, taking sick leave when they are not ill or misusing company vehicles.

3. Secrecy and concealment

  • Financial managers look for ways to keep the origin of money out of sight.
  • Employees withhold certain information from one another. For example, nobody seems to know how some colleagues obtain receipts for lunches they never had, while still submitting them as expenses.
  • Transparency is replaced by secrecy. Managers or employees may, for example, invoke privacy in order to avoid answering questions.

4. Intimidation, extortion and fear

  • An informal leader uses intimidation to create fear and influence the behaviour of colleagues.
  • Critical questions from employees are met with abuse from a manager and threats of consequences, discouraging people from asking questions.
  • Colleagues within the company are persuaded to carry out fraudulent or improper activities. They are then pressured into doing so repeatedly, with the threat that their earlier misconduct will otherwise be exposed.
  • Conflicts between colleagues are resolved through pressure, threats or displays of power, and sometimes violence, rather than through discussion.

5. Informal power

  • Some decisions are not made by formal managers, but by influential individuals inside or outside the organisation.
  • Agreements are based on personal relationships and verbal promises rather than formal procedures or contracts.

Pockets of criminal influence

Within every organisation there are two places where criminals can relatively easily establish themselves. These are ‘pockets’ where a protected subculture can develop that differs from the culture of the rest of the organisation.

The first may be a department that operates relatively independently. Colleagues outside the department and management do not have a clear view of everything that happens there. Such a pocket can allow its own subculture to develop without correction.

For example, at the police force of a large municipality there was once a secure department responsible for repairing firearms. This was specialist work that was inaccessible to colleagues elsewhere in the organisation. Because parts were regularly replaced, an opportunity arose to use them to manufacture new weapons: without serial numbers and therefore untraceable. Such weapons are extremely valuable to criminals. The weapons were sold and the proceeds divided among members of the department.

A distinct subculture had developed within the department, with shared beliefs that justified this behaviour. Making the weapons was regarded as a craft, and those who were particularly skilled at it gained status within the group. There was also a belief that it was wasteful to throw away valuable components. Buyers were also assured that the weapons would not be used for attacks, but only for practice or as collectors’ items.

A second type of pocket can develop within management itself. Here too, a protected subculture can emerge. Creating a large power distance from the rest of the workforce and locating management in a separate office can make it difficult for others to see what is happening.

One example concerns the director of a housing association. Land for construction sites was purchased from unscrupulous land dealers, enabling the director to enrich himself. He used the same tactic with property developers and contractors who were not particularly concerned about complying with laws and regulations. The arrangement was simple: they submitted inflated invoices and a percentage was paid back into the director’s private accounts – a so-called ‘kickback’.

The difficulty of taking action

Recognising the significance of warning signs is one thing. It is quite another when, having noticed those signs, you are faced with the question of what to do next. There are three ways in which people respond when confronted with danger: freeze, flee or fight.

The most common response is to freeze, to do nothing. People begin to suspect that colleagues are not only working for the company but are also providing services to criminals. They are afraid to report this because they fear reprisals. They worry about being physically harmed, unwanted visitors turning up at their front door, or what might happen to their children. So they look the other way.

Others cannot cope with the situation. They become increasingly aware of what is happening and decide to find another job or take sick leave. This too is a way of fleeing from danger.

A small proportion of people become activated by the situation. But even then, a new problem immediately arises. Acting alone is pointless. Without an overview and a strategy, intervention may actually make the situation even more complicated.

Anyone who genuinely wants to counter criminal interference must therefore look beyond recognising warning signs. It requires a collective approach, clear options for action and a willingness on the part of organisations to take responsibility as soon as warning signs emerge.

That is when the real work begins. Identifying warning signs is necessary, but not sufficient. Only when people know what to do with those signs, whom to involve and how to act together can criminal interference be effectively tackled.

Read more

Cultural interventions against criminal interference